"Executive Summary
... The Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Subcommittee on the Weaponization of the Federal Government have been conducting an investigation into government-induced censorship on social media. Although the investigation is ongoing, information obtained to date has revealed that the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)—an upstart agency within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—has facilitated the censorship of Americans directly and through third-party intermediaries.
Founded in 2018, CISA was originally intended to be an ancillary agency designed to protect 'critical infrastructure' and guard against cybersecurity threats. In the years since its creation, however, CISA metastasized into the nerve center of the federal government’s domestic surveillance and censorship operations on social media. By 2020, CISA routinely reported social media posts that allegedly spread 'disinformation' to social media platforms. By 2021, CISA had a formal 'Mis-, Dis-, and Malinformation' (MDM) team.' In 2022 and 2023, in response to growing public and private criticism of CISA’s unconstitutional behavior, CISA attempted to camouflage its activities, duplicitously claiming it serves a purely 'informational' role.
This interim staff report details, among other things, that:
- CISA is 'working with federal partners to mature a whole-of-government approach' to curbing alleged misinformation and disinformation.
- CISA considered the creation of an anti-misinformation 'rapid response team' capable of physically deploying across the United States.
- CISA moved its censorship operation to a CISA-funded non-profit after CISA and the Biden Administration were sued in federal court, implicitly admitting that its censorship activities are unconstitutional.
- CISA wanted to use the same CISA-funded non-profit as its mouthpiece to 'avoid the appearance of government propaganda.'
- Members of CISA’s advisory committee agonized that it was 'only a matter of time before someone realizes we exist and starts asking about our work'...
I. CISA has transformed into a domestic intelligence and speech-police agency, far exceeding its statutory authority
... Although CISA’s efforts to police speech are highly troubling overall, one particularly problematic aspect is CISA’s focus on 'malinformation.' According to CISA’s own definition, '[m]alinformation is based on fact, but used out of context to mislead, harm, or manipulate.' In other words, malinformation is factual information that is objectionable not because it is false or untruthful, but because it is provided without adequate 'context'—context as determined by the government...
Jen Easterly, the current Director of CISA, justified CISA’s MDM-related activities by saying: 'One could argue we’re in the business of critical infrastructure, and the most critical infrastructure is our cognitive infrastructure, so building that resilience to misinformation and disinformation, I think, is incredibly important.'
A. Switchboarding: CISA’s coordination with Big Tech to censor Americans: ... When deposed as part of ongoing litigation in federal court, Brian Scully, the head of CISA’s MDM team, confirmed that CISA has historically flagged disinformation to social media platforms, in a process known as 'switchboarding.' Scully further described switchboarding as a 'resource intensive' process whereby CISA officials received alleged 'misinformation' reports from election officials and forwarded those reports to social media companies so that they could take enforcement measures against the reported content...
B. CISA’s MDM consultants rejected constitutional 'limitations' on the surveillance and censorship of domestic speech: ... By 2020, just two years after its creation, CISA had unilaterally expanded its authorities from countering foreign influence operations to curtailing domestic speech...
D. MDM 'experts' wanted CISA to crack down on factual information: Even so-called 'malinformation'—truthful information that, according to the government, may carry the potential to mislead—could not escape the scrutiny of CISA’s MDM 'experts.' In an e-mail exchange between MDM Subcommittee members Starbird and Spaulding, Spaulding wrote: 'As I’ve read more about malinformation, I think you’re right that it could fit the kinds of risks we are concerned about. The challenge may be that because it is not false, per se . . . it is much trickier from a policy perspective'...
II. CISA colludes with third parties to circumvent the First Amendment and conduct censorship by proxy
... In a draft of its June 2022 recommendations, the MDM Subcommittee refers to this pattern of unconstitutional outsourcing, writing, 'CISA should also engage in content- and narrative-specific mitigation efforts . . . CISA should support these efforts . . . through funding outside organizations to assist in this work'...
Conclusion
In 2019, CISA’s Chief Counsel claimed: 'We are not law enforcement and we’re not the intelligence community.' In theory, the statement is accurate. CISA is not a law enforcement agency and is not authorized to act as an intelligence agency. But, in practice, that is how CISA has behaved, arrogating to itself the authority to conduct surveillance of Americans on social media. CISA expanded its unconstitutional practice by developing an elaborate social media censorship apparatus spanning multiple organizations, in order to facilitate the censorship of Americans’ political speech both directly and by proxy. There is no constitutionally viable legal authority that allows CISA to engage in this or any other kind of censorship. Thus, not only does CISA’s conduct violate the First Amendment, it also disregards the basic principle of the separation of powers, which prohibits agencies from acting outside of their congressionally delegated sphere.”
This report is a work of the United States government. Such works are not entitled to domestic copyright protection under U.S. law and are therefore in the public domain.